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A SHORT HISTORY OF 
MINERAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
The Mineral Policy Paradox in PNG 
There was a time, during the 1980s, when PNG was an attractive place for mineral exploration and 
investment, because it was seen to have a stable and user-friendly policy framework by comparison 
with many other developing countries.  This is no longer the case.  The circumstances surrounding 
and following the closure of the Bougainville copper mine in 1989, and the sequence of events 
which has led BHP Billiton to disengage from operation of the Ok Tedi mine, have both done 
enormous damage to the country’s reputation.  To read much of the recent writing on the history 
of mining and mineral policy in PNG, one gets the impression – to use a colourful English phrase – 
that the PNG government could not organise the proverbial piss-up in a brewery, let alone foreign 
investment in the mining and petroleum industries.  And both of these industries have recently 
been in steep, if not precipitous, decline.  However, closer examination of the recent history of 
mineral policy in PNG, when compared with that of many other developing countries, suggests that 
the government has done a reasonably good job of coping with difficult circumstances and 
unforeseen events.  So it is not at all obvious that disinvestment in either or both of these sectors is 
a direct consequence of mineral policies which have been poorly designed or implemented. 
For the purpose of this paper, we define ‘mineral development’ as the process of extracting mineral 
resources from the ground and converting them into mineral commodities which are then traded in 
a market, thus generating mineral wealth for a variety of national and foreign stakeholders.  ‘Mineral 
resources’ are understood to include oil and gas, as well as metallic ores, and they count as a form of 
non-renewable ‘natural capital’ which can be converted into other forms of capital, but they do not 
count as ‘mineral wealth’ so long as they lie buried in the ground.  Insofar as public policy is the 
business of government, the role of government in allocating property rights to mineral resources, 
and then regulating the distribution of mineral wealth derived from their development, is bound to 
be a very important element in any mineral policy framework. 
‘Mineral revenues’ are here defined as the share of mineral wealth which is captured or collected by 
the government from the development of mineral resources in its territory.  Direct revenues are 
collected directly from the mining industry and its employees, and are specified in the fiscal component 
of a country’s mineral policy framework, while indirect revenues are collected from other industries 
or individuals whose own incomes are derived from goods and services supplied to the mining 
industry.   
While the government collects two different kinds of revenue from the process of mineral 
development, the developers themselves incur two different kinds of cost.  First, there are the ‘direct 
or necessary costs’ which are incurred in the process of discovering, producing and selling mineral 
commodities with the techniques or technologies which are currently available.  Then there are the 
‘indirect or surplus costs’ which are incurred in the payment of taxes to the host government, the 
mitigation of environmental damage, the management of community affairs, and so forth.  But 
beyond these ‘internal costs’, which should all appear in a company’s balance sheet, there are also 
‘external costs’ or ‘externalities’, which are the costs of mineral development borne by other 
stakeholders, including future generations.  These are commonly represented as the negative economic, 
social and environmental impacts of mineral development whose value exceeds the amount which 
developers pay to compensate for such damage.  The total equation of costs, benefits and impacts 
is another major point at issue in a country’s mineral policy framework.  For if developers fail to 
‘internalise’ the full external costs of mineral development, then the simple equation of financial 
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costs and benefits, as registered in corporate and government accounts, will fail to show the extent 
to which mineral development also counts as sustainable development. 
The collection and expenditure of mineral revenues was an essential part of the National 
Development Strategy at the time of Independence, simply because the Bougainville copper mine 
accounted for 60% of the value of the country’s exports.  One might suppose that the mineral 
policy process and framework should be no less essential to the Medium-Term Development 
Strategy which has since become the Government’s official planning statement, because PNG still 
has a mineral-dependent economy.  Despite the closure of the Bougainville mine, the mining 
industry currently accounts for about 50% of the country’s exports and 20% of its Gross Domestic 
Product, while the oil industry has been contributing half as much again.  As a result, direct mineral 
revenues have been accounting for about one third, and total mineral revenues for as much as one 
half, of total government revenues from all domestic sources.  Yet the significance of mineral 
revenues for the Government’s budget is not reflected in the Government’s own expenditure plans, 
because the Department of National Planning has come to regard the mining and oil industries as 
‘sunset industries’ which cannot, by definition, be sustainable, and cannot therefore make a 
contribution to ‘sustainable development’. 
There is an element of truth, as well as an element of irony, in this one-eyed vision of the future.  
During the course of the next decade, government revenues derived from the mining and 
petroleum sectors are projected to fall to less than 20% of their current levels if no new major 
projects are developed (Finlayson 2002).  The Misima, Porgera and Ok Tedi mines will have closed, 
and current oil reserves will have been exhausted.  Even if the Gas-to-Queensland Project and the 
Ramu Nickel Project (or another large-scale mining project) proceed to development in the next 
five years, government revenues from the mining and petroleum sectors are still projected to fall to 
less than 40% of their current levels by 2012.  Some government officials seem to think that these 
losses can be partly offset by a significant expansion of the oil palm industry, but their optimism is 
probably unwarranted, and there is certainly no prospect of any major increase in revenues from 
other domestic sources.  So the question of whether and how the country’s mineral policy 
framework relates to the level of foreign investment in the mining and petroleum sectors is hardly 
one which Planning or Treasury can afford to ignore. 
In the same way that large-scale mining and petroleum projects are enclave developments within a 
national economy which mainly consists of small farmers and gardeners minding their own 
business, so it can be argued that mineral development policy has become a sort of enclave within 
the national political landscape.  While the construction of mineral policy around the time of 
Independence was closely related to the provisions of the National Constitution, the formulation of 
the National Development Strategy, the passage of the first Organic Law on Provincial 
Governments, and a set of new laws and institutions relating to the use of customary land, the 
subsequent transformations of mineral policy have been progressively isolated or insulated from 
changes in other policy domains.  Even the second Organic Law on Provincial and Local-level 
Governments has made a much smaller impact on the mineral policy framework than its designers 
intended, partly because they failed to grasp some of the basic features of the framework which 
already existed.  The only other policy domain which has retained a dynamic and reciprocal 
connection with the mineral policy framework throughout the period since Independence is that of 
‘environment and conservation’, and that is because the environmental impacts of large-scale 
mining projects have been the primary focus of policies and laws relating to any form of 
environmental planning and management. 
Our listing of the major landmarks in the development of PNG’s mineral policy framework (Box 1) 
is based on the narrow definition of ‘policy’ as something which is made by governments, even if 
the policy process engages a wider range of actors.  We also take it for granted that mineral policy in 
PNG is something which is made by the national government by virtue of its legal ownership of the 
nation’s mineral resources, even if other actors have sometimes challenged this status.  However, 
we shall not assume that the mineral policy process can be understood entirely by analysis of the 
design and implementation of successive Acts of Parliament, such as the Mining Act of 1992 or the 
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Oil and Gas Act of 1998.  Nor shall we assume that policies produced during the lifetime of ‘a 
government’ have been part of a distinctive policy agenda pursued by all or any members of the 




Box 1: Major landmarks in the development of PNG’s mineral policy framework. 
1974: Renegotiation of Bougainville Copper Agreement. 
1974: Passage of Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund Act (Chapter 194). 
1975: Establishment of Minerals and Petroleum Policy Committee. 
1976: Conclusion of original Ok Tedi Agreement. 
1977: Passage of Mining Act (Chapter 195) and Petroleum Act (Chapter 198). 
1978: Passage of Environmental Planning Act. 
1980: Conclusion of (first) Supplementary Ok Tedi Agreement. 
1986: Placer Pacific share float. 
1987: Government signs Mining Agreement for development of Misima mine. 
1988: Mount Kare gold rush. 
1988: Introduction of Development Forum. 
1988: Outbreak of Bougainville rebellion. 
1989: Conclusion of Porgera Development Forum agreements. 
1989: Revision of mineral policy framework by NEC decision 98/89. 
1990: Conclusion of Misima and Kutubu Development Forum agreements. 
1991: Conclusion of Ok Tedi Development Forum agreements. 
1992: Introduction of Infrastructure Tax Credit Scheme. 
1992: Passage of new Mining Act. 
1993: IMF review of fiscal regime. 
1993: Government insists on purchase of additional equity in Porgera project. 
1995: Revision of fiscal regime by NEC decision 46/95. 
1995: Conclusion of Lihir Integrated Benefits Package agreements. 
1995: Passage of Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level 
Governments. 
1995: Finalisation of natural gas policy statement. 
1995: Passage of Mining (Ok Tedi Restated Eighth Supplemental Agreement) Act. 
1996: Passage of Mineral Resources Development Company Pty Limited (Privatization) 
Act. 
1997: Separation of Ministry of Petroleum & Energy from Ministry of Mineral 
Resources. 
1998: Passage of Oil and Gas Act. 
2000: Conclusion of Ramu Nickel/Cobalt Project Memorandum of Agreement. 
2000: Independent review of fiscal regimes for mining and hydrocarbons. 
2001: Passage of Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation Agreement) Act. 
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Mineral Development Policy at the Moment of Independence  
The mineral policy framework which prevailed in 1975 was one which took shape during the 
lifetime of the first and second Somare governments, from February 1972 to March 1980.  Its basic 
features were established in discussion between a few key members of the first Somare 
government, supported by a team of expatriate advisers, who took the lead in renegotiating the 
terms of the Bougainville Copper Agreement and setting the initial conditions for development of 
the Ok Tedi project (Jackson 1982: 92).  Its further refinement became the responsibility of the 
Minerals and Petroleum Policy Committee established in 1975, which was chaired jointly by the 
Secretary of Finance and the Director of the Office of Minerals and Energy, which made its 
recommendations to Cabinet through their respective ministers,1 and which continued to function 
as the voice of the national government in negotiations with foreign investors.   
The substance of this policy regime is documented in five of the laws enacted by the Independent 
State of PNG: the Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund Act (Chapter 194) and the Mining (Bougainville 
Copper Agreement) Act (Chapter 196), both of which date back to 1974; the Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) 
Act of 1976 and the Mining (Ok Tedi Supplemental Agreement) Act of 1980, both of which were later 
subsumed under the Mining (Ok Tedi) Act (Chapter 363); and the Petroleum Act of 1977 (Chapter 
198).2  Its basic principles were set out in two policy statements produced by the MPPC – a brief 
statement on ‘Financial Policy Relating to Major Mining Projects’ (1975) and a longer statement on 
‘Petroleum Policy and Legislation’ (1976).  These are both summarised, discussed and endorsed in 
the report of the World Bank mission which visited PNG in 1976 (World Bank 1978).  Further 
endorsement can be found in academic literature published during or immediately after the period 
in question, some of which came from the pens of those expatriate advisers who played key roles in 
the policy process (Zorn 1973, 1977; Garnaut and Clunies-Ross 1974, 1975; Zorn and Bayne 1975; 
Garnaut 1981). 
The key question addressed in the construction of this mineral policy framework was a very simple 
one.  How could the national government capture the maximum possible share of the nation’s mineral wealth in the 
form of mineral revenues without alienating foreign investors to an extent which would deter their future investment in 
the production of more mineral wealth and more mineral revenues?  The importance of this question lay in a 
belief that the revenues derived from two very large and profitable mines, if properly applied to the 
task of national development, would enable the government and the country to escape their 
dependence on Australian aid and expertise before those mines had been exhausted.  And the 
credibility of this vision partly depended on the fluctuating price of mineral commodities. 
In 1973, the prices of gold and copper climbed to an unprecedented peak.  As a result, Bougainville 
Copper Ltd (BCL) made an enormous windfall profit from the Panguna mine which had been 
opened in the previous year.  Under the terms of the Bougainville Copper Agreement of 1967, the 
government got 20 percent of the dividends paid by the company, because it held 20 percent of the 
shares.  But the government’s equity stake in the project had been acquired at the cost of granting 
the company an exemption from corporate income tax for the first three years of production.  So 
the greater part of the windfall profit was destined for the pockets of foreign shareholders.3  This 
                                                     
1  A separate Ministry and Department of Minerals and Energy was established after the 
election of the second Somare government in 1977.  In 1975, the Director of the Office 
of Minerals and Energy reported directly to the Prime Minister in the latter’s capacity as 
Minister for Natural Resources. 
2  It is not reflected in the Mining Act (Amalgamated) of 1977 (Chapter 195), which 
recapitulated a much earlier body of colonial legislation and was not applied to the 
development of the Bougainville or Ok Tedi projects. 
3  The government’s share was estimated to be A$29 million out of a total net profit of 
A$158.4 million (O’Faircheallaigh 1984). 
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‘flight of capital’ was an affront to the Eight-Point Plan which the Somare government had adopted 
as the charter for its National Development Strategy.  This called for ‘a rapid increase … in the 
proportion of personal and property income that goes to Papua New Guineans’ and for ‘an 
increasing capacity for meeting government spending needs from locally raised revenue’.   
The Eight-Point Plan also called for ‘government control and involvement in those sectors of the 
economy where control is necessary to achieve the desired kind of development’, but the 
government’s policy makers did not regard a mining enclave as a desirable form of development in 
its own right, expropriation was not a realistic option, and they could see no point in spending more 
money to purchase a bigger equity stake in BCL if the aim was to apply mineral revenues to the 
development of other sectors of the national economy.  It was the fiscal component of the 
Bougainville Copper Agreement which therefore became the main point at issue in its renegotiation. 
The economists on the government side were not content to wind back the various tax concessions 
granted in the original agreement.  They went one step further, by suggesting that the rate of tax on 
company profits should be adjusted to reflect the total amount of such profits, so that the 
government, rather than the company’s foreign shareholders, would capture the lion’s share of any 
increase due to a surge in mineral commodity prices of the kind which had just occurred (Garnaut 
and Clunies-Ross 1975, 1983).  Aside from the standard rate of Corporate Income Tax, they 
proposed to levy an additional ‘Resource Rent Tax’ on any amount of profit which exceeded a 
‘reasonable rate of return’.4  CRA and the rest of the mining industry opposed this ‘Additional 
Profits Tax’ on the grounds that windfall profits should be their own just reward for the huge risks 
involved in exploration and investment.  But the government’s economists maintained that 
‘resource rents’, like royalties, should return to the real owner of the mineral resources from which 
they were derived.  And in this case, the real owner was the nation, as represented by the national 
government. 
This at least was the assumption made in the legislation.  But once the national government had 
settled its accounts with BCL, it still had an account to settle with the Bougainvilleans who were 
threatening to secede from the Independent State of PNG and take away its renegotiated source of 
revenue.  The first price paid for their allegiance to the nation was an agreement to return all 
mineral royalties to the province from which they originated, and the second price was the Organic 
Law which authorised the establishment of provincial governments (Conyers 1976).  The House of 
Assembly had already sought to purchase the political support of the Panguna landowners in 1966, 
when it agreed to grant them 5 percent of the royalties from the mine.  Now the other 95 percent 
would become the main source of revenue for the North Solomons Provincial Government, whose 
share in the ‘ownership’ of mineral resources received additional recognition through the grant of 
an effective power to veto any further mineral exploration in the province.   
Despite the fuss made about the fiscal component of the new policy regime, the more lasting bone 
of contention would be the set of property relations expressed or implied in the distribution of 
mineral revenues between the two tiers of government and the ‘third estate’ of customary 
landowners.  But the principles governing the ‘internal’ distribution of mineral wealth got no 
mention in the policy statement of 1975.  That is because the policy makers were preoccupied, at 
that moment, by their failure to persuade Kennecott to develop the Ok Tedi mine on fiscal terms 
broadly similar to those which BCL had grudgingly accepted in 1974.  It took another five years for 
the PNG government (and perhaps also the Australian government) to persuade BHP to take 
Kennecott’s place.  During that period, the prices of gold and copper fell to levels which cast 
considerable doubt on the role assigned to mineral revenues as a catalyst for state-led economic 
growth (Jackson 1982: 93).  But then they hit another peak in 1980, just as the finishing touches 
were applied to the Supplementary Ok Tedi Agreement which, unlike the agreement of 1976, really was 
an agreement to develop the country’s second major mine.  And 1980 was the first and only year in 
                                                     
4  This was defined as the US prime lending rate plus 4 percent, which then made 15 
percent (Jackson 1982: 64). 
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which BCL actually paid the Additional Profits Tax.  So the key articles of mineral faith in the 
National Development Strategy appeared to be quite solid after all. 
The self-congratulation of the individuals who framed this charter should not lead us to exaggerate 
the extent of its departure from the principles which had informed the negotiation of the original 
Bougainville Copper Agreement by the Australian colonial administration.  Take the question of state 
equity in mining ventures, for example.  The financial policy statement of 1975 declared that the 
government ‘welcomes offers of minority shareholdings in major projects’.  It was CRA which had 
originally made such an offer to the colonial administration, because this would have the highly 
desirable effect of giving the State a vested interest in the profitability of the mine without yielding 
effective control over its management (Denoon 2000: 92).  At one point in the renegotiation of the 
agreement, the company offered to sell the government a controlling interest in BCL as a condition 
for its own acquiescence to the Additional Profits Tax (Garnaut 1981; O’Faircheallaigh 1984).  This 
was an offer which the government’s negotiators sensibly declined.  But they did not go so far as to 
question the wisdom of purchasing 20 percent of the shares in Ok Tedi Mining Ltd, despite their 
recognition of the risk entailed in this commitment of scarce financial resources, and despite the 
prospect of a contradiction in the government’s role as a shareholder and a regulator. 
The tax concessions granted in the original Bougainville Copper Agreement owe something to the 
economic development strategy which the World Bank had recommended to the Australian 
colonial administration in 1963 (IBRD 1965).  The central plank of this strategy was to foster a 
rapid growth in the export of primary commodities by attracting foreign investment to large-scale 
forestry and agriculture projects.  But once the Panguna orebody had been discovered in 1964, a 
large-scale mining project was soon added to the shopping list.  One way in which the 
administration sought to encourage CRA’s investment in the project was to limit the ratio of 
output-based taxes to profit-based taxes, regardless of the length of the tax holidays to be granted 
during the investment recovery period.  So the royalty rate was set at 1.25 percent of the value of 
mine production, which was very low by the standards of the time.  When the tax holidays were 
renegotiated in 1974, there was no question of raising the proportion of output-based taxes in the 
total tax package.  On the contrary, the new package was a more refined expression of the fiscal 
principle set down in the original agreement, which is one of the reasons why it found favour with 
both the World Bank and the Australian government. 
What, then, were the implications of the national government’s decision to keep a tight lid on the 
level of mineral royalties, dispatch the whole lot back to their province of origin, and keep a firm 
central grip on the bulk of the profit-based taxes collected under the new fiscal regime?  First, the 
national government’s dependence on forms of mineral revenue that were bound to vary with the 
fluctuating price of mineral commodities justified the institution of the Mineral Resources 
Stabilisation Fund, which was meant to stabilise the amounts which found their way into the 
government’s annual budget.  Second, the national government had an even greater interest in 
limiting any further additions to the indirect or surplus costs incurred in the production of mineral 
wealth, which included the cost of managing or mitigating the negative impacts of development, as 
well as the payment of output-based taxes.  Finally, in contrast and opposition to the national 
government, provincial governments and local landowners had little or no stake in the profitability 
of mineral development, and would therefore come to regard their output-based share of mineral 
revenues as a form of compensation for the social and environmental costs which the national 
government might reasonably want to exclude from the developer’s bottom line. 
Environmental considerations were not entirely absent from the mineral policy regime established 
after 1972, but they were not pursued with the degree of diligence that was applied to tax matters.  
A brief statement of mineral policy in the ‘Improvement Plan for 1973-1974’ included a promise 
that ‘the Government will have power to require the use of the most modern and effective 
conservation measures’; the value of protecting the natural environment was enshrined in the 
Preamble to the National Constitution; and this constitutional imperative informed the passage of 
the Environmental Planning Act in 1978.  But the Panguna mine and the Ok Tedi prospect were both 
exempted from this legislation because the relevant development agreements were signed before 
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it came into force.  The Supplementary Ok Tedi Agreement of 1980 did mark an advance on the 
Bougainville agreements in its requirement for construction of a tailings dam, but made no advance 
on the original Ok Tedi Agreement in demanding that serious money be spent on the conduct of 
environmental impact studies (Jackson 1982: 82ff).   
The original Ok Tedi Agreement contained a number of clauses which declared that the people of 
Kiunga and Telefomin ‘sub-provinces’ (later to be known as districts) should receive preferential 
treatment in the project’s training, employment and business development programs (ibid: 163).  
This also represented an advance on the Bougainville agreements, because it implied the 
recognition of a project impact area which was smaller than a province, but larger than the area of 
land leased from customary landowners for the purpose of mineral development.  The significance 
of this innovation was explored at some length in the socio-economic impact study commissioned 
by the Department of Minerals and Energy (Jackson et al. 1980).  That study was also the first of its 
kind in PNG, and it served to underscore the exemption of the Ok Tedi project from the 
provisions of the Environmental Planning Act because it was the government, and not the mining 
company, which paid for it. 
The policy of discriminating in favour of the people who lived in the so-called ‘area of preference’ 
was initially justified by reference to the remoteness and backwardness of this area in comparison 
with other parts of the country.  But it also implied the recognition of a series of graduated zones of 
entitlement to the benefits of mineral development which could be taken as another form of 
compensation for the social and environmental costs of that development.  And, like the ‘real’ 
compensation payments due to local landowners, this kind of positive discrimination would seem 
to internalise some of those costs by adding to the indirect costs of mining itself.  However, this 
should not lead us to suppose that the national government was more generous in its dispensation 
to provincial and local stakeholders in the Ok Tedi project than it had been in the case of 
Bougainville.  On the contrary, the general feeling in Port Moresby was that the Bougainvillean 
stakeholders had commanded a premium which should not be allowed to function as a precedent 
for the distribution of mineral wealth from other projects.  So there was no equivalent of the 
‘Panguna Regional Payment’ in the compensation package allocated to the Ok Tedi landowners, 
OTML was not required to pay the 50c per tonne of output which BCL had been obliged to 
contribute to the ‘Non-Renewable Resources Fund’ administered by the North Solomons 
Provincial Government, and the Fly River Provincial Government was not granted an effective 
power to veto any further mineral exploration in Western Province. 
The various charters of the Independent State laid great emphasis on the values of ‘participation’ – 
the participation of Papua New Guineans in a national economy which was still dominated by 
foreign companies and expatriate persons, and the participation of those sections of the national 
population who would nowadays be described as ‘stakeholders’ in any specific economic venture.  
In this respect, they were seen to make a clean and decisive break with the economic policies of the 
colonial administration, including those which had been designed to satisfy the World Bank.  But 
the National Constitution also spoke of the need for an ‘equitable distribution of incomes’ between 
different parts of the country, and called for the country’s natural resources to be wisely used ‘for 
the collective benefit of us all’ and to be ‘replenished for the benefit of future generations’.  This is 
what we would nowadays call a charter for ‘sustainable development’. 
The architects of the country’s ‘new’ mineral policy regime thought that state ownership of mineral 
resources and central government control of mineral revenues were both essential to the cause of 
sustainable development.  If mineral wealth was now to be derived from one of the most remote 
and backward parts of the country, then the local benefits of mineral development would 
marginally reduce the spatial inequality of income distribution.  But the area around Ok Tedi was 
only one of many ‘less developed areas’, and a small number of scattered mining enclaves would 
still tend to widen the gap between rich regions and poor regions unless the national government 
could use a significant portion of mineral revenues to achieve the opposite effect.  Since non-
renewable resources could not exactly be ‘replenished’ for the benefit of future generations, the 
wealth derived from their extraction should ideally be invested in another form of development in 
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which a lot more Papua New Guineans would participate for a period which would not simply 
come to an end with the closure of a mine whose location was an accident of geology.  But the local 
beneficiaries of such an accident could not be expected to make this kind of investment, especially 
if they had no experience of any other form of development aside from their mineral windfall.  So 
their participation should ideally be limited to a share of mineral wealth which would be just enough 
to sustain the belief that they had gained more than they had lost from the development of a local 
resource which was ‘really’ a national resource (Filer 1997 - RR). 
What was this other form of development whose promotion would enable a mineral-dependent 
state to avoid the perpetuation of a mineral-dependent economy?  By most accounts, it was a form 
of integrated rural development constructed on a solid agricultural foundation.  But the 
government’s capacity to realise this vision was undermined by another feature of its own economic 
policy.  This was the so-called ‘hard kina’ strategy, which had the effect of aggravating that common 
affliction of mineral-dependent economies which has since come to be known as the ‘Dutch 
disease’ (Garnaut and Baxter 1984; Goodman et al. 1985; Duncan et al. 1998; Sugden 2002).  The 
appreciation in the value of the national currency was thought to be a good thing because it lowered 
the price of the imported goods which were consumed in large quantities by urban wage-earners.  
But it was not such a good thing for the national producers of agricultural commodities whose 
prices were artificially inflated (Jarrett and Anderson 1989; Baxter 2001).  Since public expenditure 
and public sector employment accounted for such a large proportion of formal economic activity, it 
could be argued that the national government’s mineral revenues were simply being ‘invested’ in a 
widening economic and social division between the urban and bureaucratic elites and the vast 
majority of rural villagers.  If the national government came to be seen as a parasite stuck to the 
back of the mining industry, then the legitimacy of its claims on the nation’s mineral wealth would 
naturally be called into question. 
Transformations of the Mineral Policy Regime under the Namaliu 
Government 
The mineral policy framework established during the lifetime of the first and second Somare 
governments, from 1973 to 1980, began to look a little shaky during the exploration boom of the 
following decade, but its wholesale reconstruction did not start until 1988.  The outbreak of the 
Bougainville rebellion is commonly cited as the key turning point in this policy process.  However, 
for the better part of 1988, the mineral policy makers in the national capital were less interested in 
the rumblings of discontent from around the Panguna copper mine than in the problem of securing 
local consent for the establishment of a new gold mine in the Porgera Valley, at the far western end 
of Enga Province, while managing the fallout from the Mount Kare gold rush nearby.  The 
sequence of events that led to the closure of the Panguna mine just added to the urgency of a 
process of policy reform which had already been initiated. 
The origin of this process can be traced to the public or populist outcry over the windfall profits 
harvested by a number of senior politicians and bureaucrats who purchased large bundles of shares 
in Placer Pacific, the Canadian company which would become the operator of both the Misima and 
Porgera mines, when the shares were floated on the Sydney stockmarket at the end of 1986.  The 
company’s intention was to broaden the base of national support for these two investments by 
creating a new class of shareholding citizens, but the outcome was a sort of ‘mental mineral boom’ 
which not only reflected the actual boom in mineral exploration expenditures, but created a 
widespread conviction that huge amounts of mineral wealth were on the point of being pocketed by 
members of a national elite who were themselves living in the pockets of the mining industry, and 
could no longer be trusted to apply this wealth to the development of the nation as a whole (Filer 
1997a: 238).  The main target of abuse was the Finance Minister, Sir Julius Chan, and the loudest 
voice in the Opposition was that of Father John Momis, the MP for North Solomons Province, 
whose own campaign for re-election to Parliament in 1987 was built around a demand for his 
constituents to get a better deal from the Panguna mine.  Although Paias Wingti’s ruling coalition 
survived that national election, and a Leadership Tribunal eventually cleared Chan of the charges 
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levelled against him, Momis had articulated a new policy agenda for the growing number of ‘mineral 
provinces’ and ‘project landowners’ across the country.   
The message was certainly not lost on Ned Laina and Yaungtine Koromba, the Premiers of Enga 
and Southern Highlands, who were instrumental in persuading the National Premiers Council 
(NPC) to set up a Mining and Petroleum Working Committee to undertake a comprehensive 
review of the existing mineral policy framework.  This body was established in June 1988 and its 
report was finished in September (PNGNPC 1988).  In the meantime, Wingti’s coalition had been 
toppled in a Parliamentary vote of no confidence, Rabbie Namaliu had been elected as the new 
Prime Minister, and he had then appointed Patterson Lowa, a member of John Momis’s Melanesian 
Alliance Party, as the new Minister for Minerals and Energy.  Lowa and Momis immediately set off 
to Panguna to hear the grievances of the local landowners, and Lowa then ordered his officials to 
commission a review of the mine’s social and environmental impact (AGA 1989).  For his part, 
Namaliu recruited a pair of expatriate economists to advise him on the process of mineral policy 
reform, and it was their dialogue with officials in the Department of Minerals and Energy which led 
to the most important innovation in the mineral policy framework since the renegotiation of the 
Bougainville Copper Agreement – which was the institution of the Development Forum (West 
1992).  This was the national government’s immediate response to the report commissioned by the 
NPC, and it was made before the outbreak of the Bougainville rebellion revealed the true extent of 
the local grievances which were still being assessed by the government’s team of consultants. 
The aim of the NPC was to influence the content of a new Mining Act which the Department of 
Minerals and Energy had begun to design in 1987.  This review of the mining legislation was 
initially a bureaucratic, not a political, initiative, and was primarily intended to rationalise the archaic 
system of prospecting and mining licences inherited from the colonial era (Dalton 1988; Hunt 
1989).  Even after this work had begun, the previous Minister for Minerals and Energy made a 
public policy statement which could have been written by the same group of expatriate advisers 
who had renegotiated the Bougainville Copper Agreement (but was actually written by his own 
officials), citing a 400% increase in exploration expenditures over the previous four years as proof 
of the ‘reasonableness and consistency’ of the existing policy framework (Kaputin 1987).  However, 
the Placer Pacific share scandal had created a climate of opinion in which the design of the new Act 
became a hot topic of public debate.  The ‘general feeling’ of the NPC was described on the first 
page of its own report: 
Here was the National Government about to completely overhaul the Mining Act, the whole 
legislative framework for the development of the mining industry in this nation, and it hadn’t even 
bothered to see what the views of PGs and the landowners were on this vital issue. 
 
Instead, the Department had been bothering to consult the newly formed Chamber of Mines and 
Petroleum to ensure the convenience of its legislation for the mining industry (PNGDME 1988).   
Most of the provisions of the Mining Act that was eventually passed in 1992, in the dog days of the 
Namaliu Government, were in fact the outcome of this earlier round of consultation.  The 
innovation of the Development Forum is confined to the Minister’s statutory obligation to convene 
one ‘before the grant of any special mining lease to consider the views of those persons who the 
Minister believes will be affected by the grant of that special mining lease’, including ‘such persons 
as he thinks will fairly represent the views’ of the applicants for the SML, the ‘landholders’ of the 
proposed SML and any other land to be leased by the applicants, the national government, and the 
relevant provincial government.5  The only provision in the Act which reflects the actual outcome 
                                                     
5  In the case of an ordinary Mining Lease, the Minister is only obliged to consult with the 
host provincial government, but a wider process of consultation has in practice been 
undertaken for medium-scale projects, such as Tolukuma and Kainantu, which have 
been developed under this type of lease. 
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of the Porgera Development Forum is the stipulated increase in the proportion of mineral royalties 
payable to the ‘landholders’, from 5% to 20% of the total collected by the State. 
The text of the Mining Act does not reflect the extent of mineral policy reform, nor the intensity of 
mineral policy debate, during the four years of the Namaliu Government.  The Porgera 
Development Forum resulted in three separate agreements between the national government, the 
Enga Provincial Government, and representatives of the Porgeran community which were finally 
signed in May 1989, and which contained a variety of undertakings that were not reflected in the 
Mining Act (Derkley 1989).  The SML landowners (and their children) were to receive a grant 
equivalent to 13% of the royalties derived from the mine, while another 10% would accrue to a 
body known as the Porgera Development Authority, which was to be responsible for the delivery 
of additional public goods and services to the people of Porgera District.  The Enga Provincial 
Government would be very generously compensated for the diminution of its own share of the 
royalties by means of a ‘Special Support Grant’ from the National Government, at the rate of 1% 
of the value of mine production, for the first decade of the mine’s operation. 
Arrangements were made for the provincial government and the landowners to acquire 49% of the 
State’s 10% equity stake in the Porgera Joint Venture, with an option to purchase the remaining 
51% after five years.6  The national government promised to make the mining company phase out 
the practice of commuter mining and build a mining town at Porgera, because representatives of 
the local community were determined to gain the development benefits which would flow from the 
process of urbanisation.  Even before these agreements were finalised, Cabinet had decided that 
those provisions which related to the distribution of mineral wealth between the three parties to the 
forum process should henceforth be part of the general policy framework.  So these were 
incorporated into a ‘Basic Mining Package’ which was used as a template for new benefit-sharing 
agreements to cover the Ok Tedi and Misima mines, both of which were already in production, and 
then to cover the development of the Kutubu oilfield, despite the fact that this would not be 
covered by the provisions of the new Mining Act.7  At the same time, those clauses in the earlier 
Bougainville and Ok Tedi agreements which obliged the mining companies to implement training 
and business development programs were now incorporated into a standard Mining Development 
Contract which was to be used as a template for future agreements between the State and the 
developers of new mining projects.8 
While project coordinators in the Department of Minerals and Energy were busily negotiating new 
‘packages’ for landowners and provincial governments in different parts of the country, the 
managers of the Porgera mine thought they detected a major flaw in the forum agreements to 
which they had not been a party.  It appeared that both levels of government were failing to keep 
some of their promises to the local community, and community representatives were 
understandably annoyed.  One particular source of annoyance was the national government’s 
apparent failure to do anything about its promise to make Placer Niugini phase out the practice of 
rotating its ‘fly-in/fly-out’ workforce through the grey skies of Porgera.  The company had good 
economic reasons for maintaining this practice, and most members of its commuting workforce 
had no desire to bring their families to Porgera (McGavin, Jones and Imbun 2001).  However, the 
managers also understood the importance of maintaining the political support of the local 
                                                     
6  In effect, the national government would ‘carry’ the cost of the 49% stake, and later 
recoup this cost out of the profits of mine production (Banks 2002). 
7  The Prime Minister tried to sell the Package to the Bougainvillean rebels in order to save 
the Panguna mine from permanent closure, but his offer was declined. 
8  The National Premiers Council had wanted provincial governments and landowners to 
be parties to these development agreements, but national government officials had 
resisted this demand (Derkley 1999). 
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community for the continued operation of the mine, and the local community now comprised a 
volatile mix of Porgeran landowners and immigrants from other parts of Enga and the Southern 
Highlands who were grasping after a share of the mine’s economic benefits (Jackson and Banks 
2002).  So they persuaded Treasury officials to introduce an ‘Infrastructure Tax Credit Scheme’ in 
the 1992 Budget.  This entailed an amendment of the Income Tax Act which would allow the 
developers of large-scale mining and petroleum projects to spend up to 0.75% of their gross 
revenues on the construction of social and economic infrastructure, and to have this counted as 
corporate income tax already paid to the government.  This meant that Placer could use its own 
engineering capacities to satisfy some of the local community’s demands for urban infrastructure, 
while also doing ‘good works’ for people in adjoining areas, hence reducing the incentive for them 
to come and settle in the vicinity of the mine.  After all that, they could bill the Government for 
their achievement. 
Although this measure would bring about a further transfer of mineral wealth from the national 
government to mineral provinces, and hence a further dilution of the principles embodied in the 
previous mineral policy framework, it was actively supported by officials in the Department of 
Minerals and Energy.  This was partly because they understood the economic logic of commuter 
mining, and had already adopted it as an article of faith when they persuaded Cabinet to approve 
Placer’s fly-in/fly-out scheme for the Misima mine in 1987.9  But more importantly, perhaps, they 
were painfully aware of their inability to make other national government agencies, let alone 
provincial governments, honour many of the commitments embodied in Development Forum 
agreements, even if they thought that these made sense.  Even if the Department of Finance and 
Planning made timely payments of Special Support Grants to provincial governments, the national 
government had no way of ensuring that these funds would be used to meet provincial government 
commitments to project communities.  Now at least the Department of Minerals and Energy would 
have the power to monitor and approve expenditures proposed by developers under the Tax Credit 
Scheme.10   
If the institution of the Development Forum and the Tax Credit Scheme were the means by which 
elements of the national bureaucracy managed to take the heat out of political demands for the 
redistribution of mineral wealth between different layers of government, or between the State and 
‘project landowners’, this was not the only aspect of the mineral policy framework which came 
under fire during the lifetime of the Namaliu Government.  Three other issues became the subject 
of acrimonious debate.  One was the environmental impact or ‘external cost’ of large-scale mining 
projects, especially the Panguna and Ok Tedi copper mines.  Another was the State’s claim to 
ownership of mineral resources.  And a third was the form and extent of national participation in 
the oil export industry which was about to be established.  In all three cases, the same government 
officials who took credit for inventing the Development Forum were less inclined to tamper with 
the status quo, but still had a hard time defending it. 
The environmental impact of the Panguna mine was one of the issues which aggrieved the local 
landowners, though the extent of its contribution to the outbreak of the Bougainville rebellion is a 
matter of some debate (Filer 1992).  In April 1989, Cabinet tried to close the proverbial stable door 
on the bolting horse by appointing a committee, under the chairmanship of John Kaputin, the 
former Minister for Minerals and Energy, to investigate the causes of the crisis and devise a strategy 
for renegotiating the Bougainville Copper Agreement.  After three years of deliberation, the 
committee recommended the establishment of a special tribunal to deal with the environmental 
impact of large-scale resource projects (Kaputin 1992; Wolfers 1992), but no action was taken to 
                                                     
9  Cabinet had initially rejected the proposal in 1986, but changed its mind when it became 
apparent that the local community was opposed to the development of a town that 
would accommodate a lot of ‘outsiders’ (including other Papua New Guineans) on a 
semi-permanent basis. 
10  It was later relieved of this power by the Department of National Planning. 
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implement this recommendation because the government’s response to the Bougainville rebellion 
had by then been detached from the mineral policy process. 
The discharge of waste rock and mine tailings into the Ok Tedi River had been an issue ever since 
the Government approved the ‘interim tailings scheme’ proposed by OTML after a landslide had 
halted work on the construction of a permanent tailings dam at the beginning of 1984.  The end of 
1988 was the deadline by which the Government required the operating company, BHP, to report 
on the feasibility of alternative waste retention options under the Sixth Supplemental Agreement of 
1986.  The company worked out that the cost of storing all the waste material would be K1.2 billion 
(Filer 1997b: 60).  Politicians from Western Province, including a former Minister for Environment 
and Conservation, were adamant that a dam should be built or the mine should be closed.  The 
government commissioned two environmental impact studies, one being a study of the other, but 
by the time the second study had been finished, OTML had announced an operating loss of more 
than K8 million for the first half of 1989, and BCL had abandoned its efforts to re-open the 
Panguna mine.  The bean counters in the bureaucracy had little trouble in convincing Cabinet to 
ratify the Seventh Supplemental Agreement in September 1989, which essentially allowed BHP to 
continue business as usual.  In May 1990, OTML was pleased to report an end-of-year profit of 
more than K24 million, and was able to portray itself as the saviour of the public purse (ibid: 61). 
The public purse had certainly not received any significant share of the estimated K150 million 
which a small army of amateur miners had extracted from the vicinity of Mount Kare following the 
accidental discovery of large nuggets of free gold in January 1988 (Ryan 1991; Vail 1995).  While the 
Mount Kare gold rush was a source of some irritation for CRA, which already held a Prospecting 
Authority over the area, its impact on mineral policy was not really felt until the party was all but 
over.  In July 1990, Parliament passed an amendment to the Mining Act which was sponsored by 
one of the national MPs who had made a handsome personal profit out of the gold rush, and which 
had the effect of giving customary landowners exclusive rights to any gold which lay within 20 
metres of the surface of the ground, regardless of any tenement already held by a mining company.  
The purpose of this political manouevre was to block a plan hatched by officials in the Department 
of Minerals and Energy to compensate CRA for its costs and losses by issuing a Special Mining 
Lease to a joint venture which the mining company had formed with a local landowner company 
which it had helped to establish.   
The bureaucrats were able to persuade the Prime Minister to block gazettal of the amendment while 
their own scheme was implemented, but this only had the effect of provoking many local 
‘stakeholders’ (including national politicians) whose earlier participation in the gold rush had 
whetted their appetite for a share of any further profits to be made out of the area.  They already 
had a champion in lawyer and Pangu Party stalwart Peter Donigi, who had been arguing for some 
time that Section 7 of the Mining Act and Section 5 of the Petroleum Act, both of which vested 
mineral rights in the state, was inconsistent with Section 53 of the National Constitution, which 
protects citizens from ‘unjust deprivation of property’ (Donigi 1994).  He orchestrated a series of 
court actions around the Mount Kare case which helped to delay the passage of the new Mining Act, 
even though they did not validate his argument.11   
Perhaps his argument was validated in another way, when ‘dissident landowners’ mounted the first 
of two armed attacks on CRA’s mining camp in March 1991.  Later that year, the Minerals and 
Energy Secretary cited the court actions as one of three factors, along with the Bougainville 
rebellion and the general decline in law and order, which would explain the anticipated decline in 
                                                     
11  That is why the Mining Act now includes a clause which says that nothing in the clause 
vesting mineral rights in the State ‘shall be construed as an additional acquisition of 
property in relation to Section 53 of the Constitution beyond that which prevailed’ 
under colonial mining legislation. 
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exploration spending in both the mining and petroleum sectors.12  When a second raid took place 
on the mining camp in January 1992, the Government reacted by creating a special police squad, 
known as the ‘Rapid Deployment Unit’, to provide ‘round-the-clock security’ for major resource 
projects, and this outfit was deployed to Porgera in June that year (Filer 1998). 
The same session of Parliament which agreed to amend the Mining Act to thwart CRA’s designs on 
Mount Kare declined to amend the Petroleum Act in a way that would have thwarted Chevron’s plans 
for development of the Kutubu oilfield.  Unlike the amendment to the Mining Act, this second 
amendment had been the subject of intense public debate for several months.  Towards the end of 
1989, five prominent national capitalists, including the ubiquitous Peter Donigi, proposed that the 
right to build and own the oil pipeline and other export facilities should not be granted to the 
Kutubu Joint Venture’s (to which the State would be a party), but should be vested in a separate 
corporate vehicle, to be known as the ‘PNG Pipeline Company’, in which PNG citizens and 
national institutions would hold at least 51%, and foreign oil companies no more than 20%, of the 
shares.  Senior bureaucrats were alarmed by the threat thus posed to the profits of the private 
partners in the KJV, because it meant that they would not be able to depreciate the cost of pipeline 
construction against their liability to corporate income tax (Brunton 1992).  Together with industry 
representatives, these officials were able to convince a majority of government ministers to oppose 
the proposal, partly by playing on the fear that the proponents were out to make a profit for 
themselves, rather than the nation as a whole (Filer 1997a).  The Petroleum Development Licence 
was issued at the end of the year, and the KJV duly built its own pipeline. 
However, in January 1992, the Prime Minister revived the spectre of nationalisation when he 
announced a Cabinet decision to establish a ‘PNG National Oil and Gas Company’ to undertake 
‘tanker, transport and bunkering operations, marketing and administration, including sale and 
purchase of oil and gas resources to and from the country, and upstream and downstream 
development and processing of oil and gas resources’ and also to act as a ‘tenders and coordination 
body to ensure equal local participation in the industry’ (Post-Courier 24/1/92).  The Minerals and 
Energy Minister complained that neither he nor his department had been consulted about a 
proposal which appeared to contradict existing government policy (Post-Courier 28/1/92), while the 
Finance and Planning Minister, who also denied any part in the decision, suggested that it might 
have been based on Cabinet’s failure to remember the existence of the Mineral Resources 
Development Company, which had long been established as the vehicle of state participation in the 
industry (Post-Courier 18/2/92).  It soon transpired that the proposal had been contained in a letter 
from the Managing Director of a Singaporean company called Quest to the Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Sir Michael Somare, and the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, Brown Bai, 
which one waggish commentator described as a case of ‘senior Government officials writing a letter 
to themselves on a foreign company’s letterhead’ (Post-Courier 21/2/92), because it turned out that 
Somare and Bai had been nominated as the company’s joint owners when its articles and 
memorandum of association had been submitted to the Registrar of Companies (Times of PNG 
20/2/92). 
Sir Michael’s oil and gas adventure was reminiscent of a deal which he previously tried to make with 
an American financier to relieve CRA of its equity stake in BCL and thus remove what he believed 
to be the major obstacle to peace in Bougainville.  In both cases, he evidently felt that he was 
dealing with a multinational corporate cabal which had hijacked the country’s mineral policy 
process and hoodwinked his ministerial colleagues.  On the eve of the 1992 national election, he 
announced that he would like to have all existing resource development agreements renegotiated 
once a new government had been installed, and instantly wiped K200 million off the value of PNG 
resource stocks on the Australian Stock Exchange (Post-Courier 20/5/92).  Just for good measure, he 
called for the Minister and Secretary of Minerals and Energy to be sacked because they had allowed 
                                                     
12  The Minister subsequently told Parliament that he and his Secretary had both been 




Chevron to start exporting oil without doing anything about the National Oil and Gas Company 
(Post-Courier 22/6/92).  Meanwhile, Namaliu had disowned Somare’s remarks, and called instead for 
all leaders, especially the Leader of the Opposition, Paias Wingti, to take a strong stand against the 
‘carpetbaggers, crooks and spivs’ who had come to pick the fruits of the mining industry.  And he 
did not mean CRA. 
Dilemmas of Distribution and Disinvestment 
After the national election of 1992, Namaliu and Somare found themselves back on the opposition 
benches, as Wingti had the numbers to secure his second term as Prime Minister, appointing Julius 
Chan as his Minister for Finance and Masket Iangalio as his Minister for Mining and Petroleum.  If 
the officials in Iangalio’s department thought they had done a reasonable job of protecting the 
industry from excessive political interference, they were soon to find that the loss of their ‘energy’ 
function was matched by a drastic loss of political influence.  Wingti and Iangalio did not have an 
axe to grind with the oil industry, but did have their sights set on Porgera and Mount Kare.  In that 
context, they took their advice from two of the characters who might have been the object of the 
previous Prime Minister’s disparagement – Australians Denis Reinhardt and Robert Needham.   
Reinhardt’s role was to arrange alternative sources of finance to find and develop the rich prize still 
thought to lurk beneath Mount Kare, while Iangalio and other Engan politicians set about the task 
of prising CRA from its Prospecting Authority.  This task was accomplished in March 1993, in 
circumstances which heralded the company’s later decision to abandon the whole country (Filer 
1998).  Needham had been the Managing Director of Placer Pacific at the time of its famous share 
float, and he had long since convinced Wingti that Placer had deliberately misled the government 
over the value of the gold reserves at Porgera in order to discourage the government from 
exercising the full extent of its option to take up equity in the project.  In September 1992, Wingti 
had him appointed as Managing Director of the Mineral Resources Development Company, and in 
the following month, word of the government’s intention to renegotiate the Porgera Development 
Agreement reached the pages of the Australian press, from where it inspired a further loss of K450 
million in the value of PNG resource stocks (Post-Courier 12/10/92, 16/10/92).   
This was indeed a bad month for Porgera, because a member of the Rapid Deployment Unit which 
had been sent to guard the mine from the forces of darkness allegedly shot and killed a local 
landowner, thus provoking an armed assault on the company’s residential compound which cost 
about K1 million in repairs and improvements to security installations, and which also frightened a 
number of staff and workers into tendering their resignations.  However, after five months of 
grumbling about the prospect of ‘expropriation’, each of the other three partners in the Porgera 
Joint Venture finally agreed a price at which to sell the government an additional 5% stake in the 
project, thus raising the government’s share to 25% of the total equity.13 
Iangalio, Reinhardt and Needham then turned their attention to the Lihir gold prospect, whose 
development had been delayed by the persistent dithering of Kennecott and its eventual owner, Rio 
Tinto Zinc.  Iangalio caused RTZ to dither even more when he announced that the State would 
take up its full entitlement to 30% equity in the project and would take another 20% at cost if the 
company failed to sell that 20% stake to a third party.  Reinhardt proposed that a separate company 
should be formed to develop the project in place of an unincorporated joint venture, while 
Needham was doing a separate deal with the Malaysian Mining Corporation, whereby it would 
acquire a 20% stake in the project on the same terms as the government if it managed to arrange 
finance for the government’s own 30% stake.  This arrangement was apparently confirmed in talks 
between Wingti and the Malaysian Prime Minister, but Iangalio had now decided to support 
                                                     
13  This deal was promptly followed by the leakage of an IMF report which strongly advised 
the Government to abandon its policy of taking equity in major resource projects.  This 
caused the Finance Minister, who had commissioned the report, to utter dire threats 
against the government officials who had leaked it to the press. 
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Reinhardt’s proposal, and used this as the basis for further talks with RTZ after the company had 
annoyed the government by selling off part of its equity without prior consultation.  Meanwhile, the 
local landowners had decided that the ‘spare’ 20% equity stake should belong to them, and made 
this the sticking point in the first Development Forum convened in November 1993 (Filer 1995). 
Wingti moved Iangalio to the Finance Ministry in January 1994.  The new Mining and Petroleum 
Minister, John Kaputin, decided to suspend talks with RTZ until the company’s chairman agreed to 
come to PNG to talk to the Prime Minister.  Needham produced an alternative development plan 
known as the ‘Lihir Mining Study’, but would not reveal its contents to other government officials.  
In April 1994, Iangalio used his own ministerial powers to have Needham fired from his position.  
Kaputin responded by attacking Reinhardt’s role as Iangalio’s adviser, but then hired another 
consultant to review Needham’s scheme.  This consultant, who was formerly the Managing 
Director of OTML, told the Minister that RTZ now had the better proposal, and supported 
Reinhardt’s idea of floating a separate company to develop the project.  By the end of August, the 
RTZ Chairman, Sir Derek Birkin, had finally agreed to the Minister’s demand that he should come 
to PNG in person, but before he could meet with the Prime Minister, Parliament had voted to 
remove Wingti from office. 
One of the first public undertakings made by the new Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, was to ‘fast-
track’ the development of the Lihir mine.  His interest in the project was partly due to its location in 
his own constituency, but partly also to his knowledge that the government was virtually 
bankrupt.14  The appointment of John Giheno, a Pangu Party pragmatist, as the new Minister for 
Mining and Petroleum did much to relieve the siege mentality of the Mining Division staff who 
worked in General Macarthur’s wartime headquarters.  Giheno was able to reconvene the Lihir 
Development Forum in February 1995, the Mining Development Contract was signed in March, 
and in April the leaders of the Lihir community were finally persuaded to accept an ‘Integrated 
Benefits Package’ containing all the compensation and benefit-sharing agreements in which they 
had an interest.15  In October 1995, amidst great public fanfare, the partners in the Lihir Joint 
Venture each sold off more than half of their equity in the project through an ‘Initial Public 
Offering’ of shares in the new development company, Lihir Gold Ltd, and this provided a large 
chunk of the finance required for construction of the mine.  More to the point, it enabled the State 
to pay for most of its own share of the development costs, because the price at which it had 
exercised its option to take a 30% stake in the project was considerably less than the price at which 
it had now sold part of that stake to the public.16   
The significance of this point was that the State had still not found the wherewithal to pay for the 
additional 15% stake in the Porgera mine which it had demanded from the other joint venture 
partners in March 1993.  From the earliest days of the Chan government, those officials who were 
privy to the scheme to develop the Lihir mine by means of a share float had persuaded their 
political masters to go one step further, and sell off a proportion of the equity already held by the 
Mineral Resources Development Company.  The 1995 Budget contained an undertaking to sell off 
a fairly modest proportion of the State’s equity in the Ok Tedi, Porgera and Kutubu projects, but 
                                                     
14  Future mineral revenues had already been mortgaged to a Swiss Bank in return for a 
commercial loan – much to the annoyance of the World Bank and the IMF. 
15  This package marked a new stage in the development of the Development Forum 
because it ‘integrated’ the compensation agreements between the Lihir Management 
Company and the lease area landowners with the benefit-sharing agreements between 
the State, the landowners, and the rest of the local community. 
16  The State’s option is to take equity at a price which is proportional to its share of the 
‘sunk costs’ of exploration, which is almost bound to be less than the market price of 
equity in a project under development. 
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the Mineral Resources Development Company Pty Limited (Privatization) Act of 1996 led to the 
flotation of another public company, Orogen Minerals Ltd, which was to take over all of the equity 
previously held by MRDC, except for those assets held in trust for landowners and provincial 
governments under Development Forum agreements.17  The State would retain a 51% stake in 
Orogen, and Orogen would have first option on any equity which the State might choose to acquire 
in new mining and petroleum projects (if this were not reserved for landowners or provincial 
governments), but Orogen would not have the power to force the State to exercise its own equity 
option.  By this device, the government was not only relieved of some of its existing debts, but also 
began to travel the path prescribed by most orthodox economists for more than a decade, which 
was to recognise that the state equity option was bad for business and bad for the State (see 
Goodman et al. 1985: 138; Tilton et al. 1986: 26).18 
Nevertheless, the government had been obliged to pay a price for insisting that it could not afford 
to ‘carry’ the 20% equity stake in the Lihir mine which local community leaders had been 
demanding since 1993.  The landowners were only persuaded to accept a smaller 15% stake (which 
was then diluted by the flotation of Lihir Gold Ltd) in return for an increase in the royalty rate from 
1.25% to 2% of the value of mine production, and hence an increase in the value of the 50% share 
of these royalties which would return to the landowners or the local government of Lihir under the 
terms of the Integrated Benefits Package (Filer 1995: 69).  This increase in the royalty rate would 
apply to all mining and petroleum projects, including those already in production, and was included 
in a policy package unveiled at the PNG Mining and Petroleum Investment Conference held in 
Sydney in March 1995.  The other main feature of this package was an undertaking to grant 
landowners a ‘free’ 5% equity stake in any major resource projects approved for development after 
the end of that year, the cost of which would be shared between the State and the developers in 
proportion to their own stakes in a joint venture.19  
Both measures would have sounded like very bad news to the investors at the conference if the 
government had not simultaneously promised to treat the extra royalty as a tax credit and to raise 
the total amount of expenditure which companies could claim as income tax already paid under the 
Tax Credit Scheme from 0.75% to 2% of their gross income.  Unfortunately for them, Treasury 
officials ‘forgot’ to include this latter measure in the 1996 Budget, and although the extension was 
finally granted in the 1998 Budget, this act of belated generosity was offset by the simultaneous 
requirement for companies to pay the full 2% royalty out of their own pockets, rather than claim 
0.75% of it as an additional tax credit.20 
The looming destabilisation of the fiscal regime was compounded by the implications of the 
Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments which came into effect 
shortly after the Lihir development agreements had been signed.  While this law clearly endorsed 
                                                     
17  Orogen did not acquire the State’s equity in the Ok Tedi project, because that was no 
longer held by MRDC. 
18  One of the Papua New Guinean members of this economic fraternity, Charles Lepani, 
was appointed as Orogen’s first Managing Director. 
19  The Finance Minister, Chris Haiveta, told the conference that the package was justified 
by ‘a social and moral need … to lock landowners into a real sense of obligation and 
ownership of projects on their land to reduce or minimise [the] local content of political 
risk’ (Post-Courier 27/3/95). 
20  The Department of Mining has since taken the view that the promise of ‘free equity’ in 
large-scale mining projects is only an undertaking on the part of the State to ‘free carry’ 
the landowning community’s share of exploration costs, which does not mean that 
landowners are exempt from contributing their share of development costs. 
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and expanded the principle of the Development Forum by requiring all three levels of government 
to ‘liaise fully’ with local landowners in the development of any natural resources, the law makers 
also seem to have decided that the collection and redistribution of government revenues from all 
natural resource sectors should also be governed by a single set of principles.21  So the Organic 
Law proposed that 100% of the royalties derived from any natural resource should henceforth be 
paid to local landowners, while the developer of any such resource should also pay, ‘out of its own 
cost’, an unspecified amount of ‘development levies’ to the provincial and local-level governments 
of the province or area hosting the development for the purpose of ‘infrastructural development’, 
‘economic development and land use follow-up’, and ‘community and social development’.  
Government officials responsible for the mineral policy framework were quick to point out that 
these provisions were derived from the forest policy framework, that the royalty provision 
undermined the principle of state ownership of mineral resources, and that the purpose of 
imposing development levies was already covered by Special Support Grants and the Tax Credit 
Scheme.22  Although subsequent amendments diluted the wording of the clause which related to 
royalties, they left the development levies intact, and even added a requirement for developers to 
provide all three levels of government with ‘expertise and professional advice’ about their use (Filer 
1997a: 248-9). 
Despite the air of additional uncertainty thus imparted to the mineral policy framework, the saving 
grace of the Organic Law was that none of the provisions relating to ‘Benefits Derived from 
Natural Resources’ would affect the substance of existing development agreements, and most could 
not come into effect until the Petroleum Act or the Mining Act had been replaced or amended.  
However, its more immediate effect was to threaten the abolition of the ‘Development Authorities’ 
which had been established at Porgera and Lihir as vehicles for the the collection and disbursement 
of mineral revenues for the benefit of the two local communities.  The Porgerans were so incensed 
by this prospect that they threatened to close down the mine unless the preservation of the Porgera 
Development Authority was guaranteed by the Local-level Governments Administration Act which 
had to be passed before the new system of local government could be put in place.  Their wishes 
were duly accommodated.23 
The wishes of the people living near the banks of the Ok Tedi River were not so readily 
accommodated, despite their longstanding aggravation over the effect of mine wastes on their 
livelihood.  They were not in a position to close down the Ok Tedi mine by force, because their 
territorial domains do not embrace the mine site or the route through which the mine is supplied 
and its product is exported.  They were not party to a compensation agreement with OTML, they 
had not participated in the Ok Tedi Development Forum, nor had they seen any noticeable benefit 
from the swollen revenue streams which had since flowed to the Fly River Provincial Government.  
The new Organic Law would certainly not make any difference to the other swollen stream which 
was their daily companion.  But they did have the services of an angry anthropologist (Kirsch 2002), 
and from this modest start, they acquired a larger group of well-heeled foreign sympathisers, 
including a team of Australian lawyers who acquired a mandate to sue BHP for damages in the 
                                                     
21  This idea had been around for many years, and could even be seen as a sort of 
constitutional imperative (PNGLRC 1990; Brunton 1994), but its main champions had 
not been active in the drafting of the new Organic Law, nor was it clearly articulated in 
the drafting instructions produced in July 1994. 
22  In their haste to assign all royalties to local landowners, the legal draftsmen also seem to 
have forgotten that ‘royalty grants’ from the national government to mineral provinces 
should have been deducted from derivation grants payable to provincial governments. 
23  Part VII of the Act as passed in 1997 allows for the National Government to establish 
‘Special Purposes Authorities’ to carry out some of the functions which would otherwise 
be the responsibility of local-level governments.   
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Victorian Supreme Court.  When news of this action broke out during the final months of the 
Wingti Government, Chris Haiveta, then Leader of the Opposition, described it as the work of 
‘foreign spivs, crooks and carpetbaggers’ (Post-Courier 5/5/94) – a phrase which had now been 
firmly entrenched in the lexicon of national political debate.  With the notable exception of Perry 
Zeipi, the Western Province MP who had once again become the Minister for Environment and 
Conservation, most politicians on both sides of Parliament expressed very similar views throughout 
the period of more than two years which elapsed before BHP finally agreed to an out-of-court 
settlement in June 1996.   
In April 1995, Cabinet approved an Eighth Supplemental Agreement in which a new compensation 
package was offered to those downstream landowners who would agree to dissociate themselves 
from the Australian court case, and a range of penalties was proposed for those who refused to do 
so.  The Australian judge was not at all amused by the fact that BHP’s own lawyers had been party 
to the drafting of this piece of legislation, and found that this constituted a contempt of his own 
court (Gordon 1997).  While the company was greatly embarrassed by this finding, the PNG 
government pressed on with a ‘Restated’ version of the Eighth Supplemental Agreement, from 
which the penalty clauses had largely been removed, and a separate Compensation (Prohibition of Foreign 
Legal Proceedings) Act, which aimed to prohibit any further legal proceedings in foreign courts over 
claims for compensation against mining or petroleum projects in PNG.  However, once BHP had 
agreed to an out-of-court settlement, the government made no attempt to prosecute the former 
plaintiffs in the case, and allowed that they would still be eligible to receive the compensation 
offered in the Restated Agreement, despite the fact that they had failed to meet the original deadline 
for acceptance.  In its capacity as a partner in OTML, the government also endorsed the Lower Ok 
Tedi Agreement which was concluded in May 1997, granting additional compensation to the people 
of 15 villages in the area most seriously affected by the company’s waste disposal practices. 
Although this process of litigation, legislation and compensation generated a great deal of public 
debate in PNG, and a good deal of negative publicity around the world, it did not make much 
immediate impact on the country’s wider mineral policy framework, precisely because the legal 
framework already treated the Ok Tedi project as a special case, and this latest episode simply 
underlined the Government’s determination to keep it that way.  The passage of the new 
Compensation Act was little more than a way for national politicians and bureaucrats to compensate 
for what most of them felt to be a serious affront to the sovereign powers of the State.  However, 
the internationalisation of the dispute was itself a significant milestone in the mineral policy process, 
because it showed the extent to which this had ceased to be an exclusive process of negotiation and 
consultation between the host government and the foreign investor, or even between the parties to 
the Development Forum, and was now exposed to the intervention of a multitude of ‘unofficial 
stakeholders’ (Filer 1997b: 85). 
There was at least one corner of the mineral policy domain where official business was still being 
conducted in the customary manner, with minimal disturbance from the pressures of public 
political debate.  The point at issue here was the need to amend the Petroleum Act and the fiscal 
regime to facilitate development of the very substantial gas reserves associated with the oil which 
was already being exported from various fields in the Kutubu complex.  The technicalities of a 
national gas policy had been under discussion for several years (see Millett 1992), but this was not 
the sort of talk that could ignite the public imagination.  The government issued a White Paper on 
the subject in September 1995 (PNG 1995), and that was also the year in which the Petroleum 
Division began to receive ‘Technical Assistance’ to carry the process forward under the terms of a 
US$11 million loan from the World Bank.24   
                                                     
24  There could hardly have been a greater contrast between the amount of publicity 
generated by the World Bank’s role in promoting the process of forest policy reform 
during the years of the Chan Government (Filer et al. 2000) and the complete absence 
of public debate about its parallel role in the petroleum sector. 
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The complexity of the issues at stake was compounded by the appearance of two different 
proposals for development of the gas reserves.  British Petroleum, the operator of the Hides Gas 
Project which already supplied electrical power to the Porgera mine, was investigating the feasibility 
of a liquid natural gas project with an onshore liquefaction plant (CIE & NCDS 1997), while 
Chevron, the operating partner in the Kutubu and Gobe oil projects, was proposing to build a 
pipeline across the Torres Strait and supply dry gas to industrial customers in Queensland.  
Discussion of these two proposals was primarily couched in terms of the projected economic costs 
and benefits to the nation as a whole, but ongoing arguments about the internal distribution of 
revenues and benefits from the oil industry were seen to constitute an additional political risk for 
the scale and duration of the investment which either of them would entail.  So the government 
sought additional technical assistance from the Asian Development Bank to find new ways of 
dealing with the ‘landowner problems’ which were specific to the hydrocarbon sector (Taylor and 
Whimp 1997). 
By the time that Bill Skate took over the reins of government after the national election of 1997, a 
decision had already been taken to split the Ministry and Department of Petroleum and Energy 
from the Ministry and Department of Mineral Resources.  The new policy framework for the 
hydrocarbon sector was legislated in the Oil and Gas Act which replaced the Petroleum Act at the end 
of 1998.  The new Act, like the Mining Act of 1992, was an attempt to square two different 
circles – one of which was about the promotion and regulation of the industry itself, while the 
other was about the distribution and consumption of the national share of the wealth which 
might yet be derived from it.  The second of these circles now also had to be squared in a 
manner that would be consistent with the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-
level Governments. 
The puzzles contained in this second circle were addressed in a two-day seminar convened by the 
Department of Petroleum and Energy in January 1998.  This led to the creation of a Petroleum 
Project Benefits Action Team, containing representatives of several government agencies and all the 
main industry players, which met on numerous occasions throughout the rest of the year.  The 
deliberations of this body may well have constituted the most extensive process of consultation 
between the Government and the private sector over any piece of sectoral legislation in the period 
since Independence, although they did not rate a mention in the national press.  By June 1998, the 
Action Team had come up with drafting instructions for a separate piece of legislation to be known 
as the Petroleum (Project Benefits) Act, but the Department then decided to incorporate some of the 
recommended measures into the Oil and Gas Act, while leaving others to be treated as matters of 
policy or regulation.   
The Oil and Gas Act complies with the Organic Law to the extent of imposing a 2% ‘development 
levy’ on the wellhead value of all petroleum products, but neutralises the fiscal effect of this 
measure by extending the scope of the Tax Credit Scheme to cover the 2% royalty for which 
developers are also liable.  While this device was designed to protect the industry’s bottom line, it 
also entails a substantial increase in the proportion of mineral wealth which is repatriated from the 
national coffers to the host province.  The Act seeks to limit the potential abuse of such revenue 
flows by regulating the distribution and use of the ‘royalty benefits’ and ‘equity benefits’ which the 
State sees fit to allocate to provincial governments, local-level governments and project area 
landowners, while apparently conceding that its right to regulate the distribution and use of 
development levies is constrained by the wording of the Organic Law.25  The proportions in which 
the royalty and equity benefits are distributed between the local landowners, local-level 
governments and provincial governments ‘affected by a project’ are themselves to be determined by 
negotiation between the parties in a Development Forum.  However, the Act allows the Minister to 
determine the proportions in which the landowner benefits should be subdivided amongst the 
                                                     
25  The word ‘benefit’ is meant to avoid the implication that landowners have an 




landowners by reference to the extent of their rights over the land leased to the developers or the 
extent of the project’s impact on their livelihood, and if there is more than one provincial or local-
level government ‘affected’ by a project, the Act says that their benefits shall be subdivided in 
accordance with the number of project area landowners in their respective jurisdictions.  
Furthermore, the Act empowers the Minister to decide who counts as a landowner, and who counts 
for how much of a landowner, on the basis of ‘social mapping’ and ‘landowner identification’ 
studies which have to be carried out before he convenes the Development Forum. 
The Act goes on to say that the package of royalty and equity benefits distributed through this 
process must not be worth more than 20% of the ‘total net benefit’ which the State derives from 
any given project, and the package must be held in trust for the beneficiaries by a subsidiary of the 
Mineral Resources Development Company.  The Act then requires at least 30% of the net income 
of a trust established on behalf of project area landowners to be spent on the provision of ‘social 
services or community development projects’, and at least as much again to be spent for the benefit 
of ‘future generations’, which means that landowners cannot access more than 40% of the net 
income from the trust in the form of cash payments.  The Act also imposes a parallel form of 
control over the expenditure of any monetary benefits allocated to a provincial or local-level 
government, including that made by a developer under the Tax Credit Scheme, by subjecting it to 
the oversight of an Expenditure Implementation Committee controlled by the national 
government.26 
If the Oil and Gas Act was meant to construct an appropriate policy framework for development of 
the country’s natural gas resources, it evidently failed to convince the moguls of British Petroleum, 
who decided to divest themselves of all their assets in PNG and focus their attention on 
development of the Tangguh gas field in West Papua.  This decision spelt the end of the proposal 
for a liquid natural gas project in PNG, and thus left Chevron’s so-called ‘Gas-to-Queensland’ 
project as the only feasible development option on offer to the government.  It is hard to assess the 
extent to which BP’s decision was motivated by its assessment of political risk in PNG, rather than 
by wider strategic considerations, but it seems to have reduced the incentive for Chevron and its 
joint venture partners to expedite their own alternative proposal, while limiting the government’s 
capacity to push them further down the road to development. 
The political risks of engaging with the Skate government were certainly not lost on the IMF and 
the World Bank, whose withdrawal of support was one of the factors which brought about that 
government’s downfall in July 1999.  The new Prime Minister, Mekere Morauta, was seen in 
Washington as a ‘friend of the Bank’, just as he was seen in Canberra as a ‘friend of Australia’.  The 
Bank was now able to move forward with a structural adjustment program which had the necessary 
appearance of ‘borrower ownership’, and under that general umbrella came the design and 
implementation of two more institutional strengthening projects.  The Gas Development and 
Utilisation Technical Assistance Project was meant to facilitate the implementation of the Oil and 
Gas Act, while the Mining Sector Institutional Strengthening Project was a part of a broader push to 
reverse the prospect of diminishing returns from a mining industry which showed little interest in 
the discovery and development of new resources to replace the revenues derived from existing 
projects.  Now, for the first time since Independence, the Bank was set to become a key player in 
the reconstruction of the whole mineral policy framework, and that was because its officials now 
                                                     
26  This body is meant to ensure that the disbursement of all grants (in cash or in kind) 
made by the national government to provincial or local-level governments, the spending 
of all funds held in trust for them by a subsidiary of MRDC, and any expenditures by 
the developer under the Tax Credit Scheme are made ‘in accordance with development 
plans submitted by the relevant Local-level Government or Provincial Government’.  
Four years after the passage of the Act, the Department of Petroleum and Energy was 
still engaged in the production of guidelines for the operation of such bodies, so none 
had yet been established. 
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recognised that the national government and the national economy would sink or swim in the 
murky waters of mineral dependency. 
In the report which accompanied and justified the structural adjustment program agreed at the end 
of 1999 (World Bank 1999), the Bank put the final nail in the coffin of the Mineral Resources 
Stabilisation Fund, observing that it had long since failed to prevent the national government from 
mortgaging its prospective mineral revenues to finance unsustainable levels of public expenditure, 
and should therefore be replaced by stricter rules for the investment of such revenues.27  The 
World Bank also encouraged the government to undertake a thorough review of the fiscal regime in 
the mining and petroleum sectors, to create additional incentives for investment in these sectors, 
and to restrict its own right to move the goal posts around the new playing field.  The review was 
funded by the Asian Development Bank (Daniel et al. 2000), and some of its key recommendations 
were incorporated into the 2001 Budget, including a promise to reduce and stabilise the effective 
rates of tax on both industries and to grant investors the right to negotiate fiscal stability clauses 
into their contracts with the State.28  The main target of these reforms was the investment climate 
in the mining sector, but the industry’s response was less enthusiastic than it might have been, 
firstly because the government had still failed to reduce effective tax rates to levels comparable with 
those found in many other developing countries, and secondly because these other countries were 
also given lower risk ratings by the likes of Standard and Poors. 
In the absence of any new surge of enthusiasm for mineral exploration, the attention of 
government policy makers in the mining sector was now firmly focused on the question of how to 
close mines down rather than how to open them up (Jackson 2002).  Although the ‘Basic Mining 
Package’ had included a commitment by the national government to fund the production of a 
‘long-term economic development plan’ for the area affected by each major mining operation, this 
was one of the commitments which had largely been forgotten.  Now that the closure of the 
Misima mine loomed within the government’s own 5-year planning horizon, officials in the 
Department of Mining organised a process of consultation which led to the production of a Draft 
Mine Closure Policy in 2000, followed by the establishment of a Misima Mine Closure Committee 
in 2001.  While the draft policy covered a number of technical issues involved in the rehabilitation 
of abandoned mine sites, it also called for the incorporation of a long-term ‘social and economic 
development plan’ within the mine closure plan to be submitted by the developer as part of the 
approval process for each major project.  This was understood to be a plan to finance the provision 
and maintenance of benefits for local communities after the point of closure.  Although the 
operator of the Misima mine had already produced its own mine closure plan, had paid for the 
‘long-term economic development plan’ which should have been funded by the national 
government (Jackson 2001), and was now financing the meetings of the Mine Closure Committee, 
there was in fact no mechanism to ensure that the people of Misima would continue to receive the 
benefits to which they had become accustomed under the terms of the mine development 
agreements.  Nor was there any obvious reason why the government or the developer should pay 
for these people, or the members of other mine-affected communities, to receive such benefits 
beyond the life of each mining operation, if these benefits were in excess of those provided to all 
other communities in the country and could not be justified as a form of compensation for the 
legacy of social or environmental damage caused by the mine. 
                                                     
27  The Bank argued that since the holdings in the Fund were matched by domestic debt in 
the form of treasury bills, its abolition would have no monetary consequences provided 
an equivalent amount of government securities were redeemed.  Instead, it 
recommended that the Bank of PNG should manage stabilisation issues through the 
domestic debt market, by tightening monetary policy to safeguard reserves. 
28  The second of these promises was given legal effect with the simultaneous passage of 
the Resource Contracts Fiscal Stabilisation Act (2000). 
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The Ok Tedi mine was one whose legacy of environmental, if not social, damage would indeed be 
very significant.  BHP was now eager to remove this blemish from its own portfolio, and was 
therefore looking to transfer its majority shareholding in OTML to an institution that would 
manage this legacy on its own account, without further risk to the Big Australian’s global 
reputation.  One of Mekere Morauta’s first actions as Prime Minister was to ask the World Bank to 
review OTML’s own assessment of the risks attached to its ‘Mine Waste Management Project’.  The 
Bank recognised that the best option, from an environmental point of view, would be to close the 
mine down immediately, but the social and economic cost of doing so would be unacceptably high, 
precisely because there was as yet no clear plan or strategy for managing the closure process (World 
Bank 2000a).  Since Ok Tedi was still regarded as a special case within the mineral policy 
framework, and BHP’s pursuit of an early exit strategy was now serving to underline its unique 
status, the government was obliged to respond by making further changes to the legislation under 
which it operated. 
The Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation [Ninth Supplemental] Agreement) Act of 2001 made 
provision for BHP Billiton to gift its shareholding to an entity called the ‘PNG Sustainable 
Development Program Company’ in return for a government guarantee that it would henceforth be 
immune to any more ‘environmental claims’ in respect of the damage caused by the mine.  This 
new company was incorporated in Singapore, with a board comprising one Singaporean member, 
three representatives of national institutions (the Department of Treasury, the Bank of PNG, and 
the PNG Chamber of Commerce), and three people appointed by BHP Billiton.29  The new 
company’s basic mandate was to invest two thirds of its mining profits in a ‘Long Term Fund’, and 
to spend the balance of its income, including the interest on this long-term investment, on the 
implementation of ‘sustainable development projects’ in both Western Province and the rest of 
PNG, throughout and beyond the remaining life of the mine (PNGSDPL 2002). 
The revenues available to the Program Company would be reduced by a separate clause in the 
Ninth Supplemental Agreement, which required OTML to establish and fund the Ok Tedi 
Development Foundation as a second instrument for the promotion of sustainable development in 
Western Province.  This body would be responsible for spending K180 million on the mine-
affected communities over the remaining life of the mine, of which 16% was to be paid in cash to 
community members, 58% to be provided in the form of development projects, and 26% to be 
invested in trust for future generations.  The 149 ‘mine-affected communities’ were divided into six 
areas, and community representatives from each area signed up to separate Community Mine 
Continuation Agreements which were attached as schedules to the main agreement.  These 
uniformly state that ‘the economic opportunities offered by the Company’s Commitments 
represent to the Communities an acceptable trade off for the environmental impacts of the future 
operation of the mine’, and this is ‘the complete, final and binding basis on which they agree to 
support the continuation of the Mine’.  Section 8 of the main agreement states that the ‘signature or 
other execution of a Community Mine Continuation Agreement by a person representing or 
purporting to represent a Community or clan, or that person’s delegate, binds all members of that 
Community or clan’ to the agreement, including ‘children and persons who are subsequently born 
into, or who subsequently join, that Community or clan’, even if other members or representatives 
of the group are not party to the agreement.   
If this device served to manufacture the appearance of popular consent for the continued operation 
of the mine, it did nothing to address the lack of government capacity to participate in the planning 
of mine closure or sustainable development in Western Province.  In 2000, when the Fly River 
Provincial Government was in one if its periodic states of suspension, OTML was able to persuade 
the national government to establish a ‘Western Province Capacity Building Project’ whose staff 
                                                     
29  One of these last three people, who was also appointed as chairman of the board, was 
Professor Ross Garnaut, the main architect of the PNG’s original Resource Rent Tax.  
Professor Garnaut has also been the chairman of Lihir Gold Ltd since that company 
was established in 1995. 
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would be directly accountable to a committee comprising representatives of several national 
government agencies, as well as OTML and the provincial government.  This institution was to be 
funded through direct transfers of a 25 percent share of the mining royalties and Special Support 
Grant that would otherwise have been subsumed in the provincial budget, while its management 
and technical support costs were also meant to be covered by the government.  By 2002, it was 
already evident that the national government could not or would not meet its own commitments, 
so the project’s funding was limited to the royalty stream which came directly from OTML.  The 
mining company was also covering the project’s management and technical support, but was 
threatening to end this subsidy unless the national government abandoned the practice of placing all 
of its own contributions in the black hole otherwise known as the Provincial Operating Account 
(Simpson 2002). 
When the World Bank finalised its appraisal of the proposed loan of US$10 million to the PNG 
government for the Mining Sector Institutional Strengthening Project in May 2000 (World Bank 
2000b), its primary aim was to strengthen the capacity of national government agencies to attract 
new foreign investment to the sector, rather than deal with the lack of capacity at lower levels of 
government or assist in the implementation of agreements already made for existing mines.30  
However, by the end of that year, Bank staff were encouraging the national government to include 
a ‘sustainable development policy’ component in the project in order to establish a common 
planning framework for the local and regional development strategies which had evolved around 
each of the country’s major mine sites.  This late addition to the suite of project activities was partly 
motivated by President Wolfensohn’s decision to commission an independent review of the Bank’s 
involvement in both the mining and petroleum sectors in response to the complaints of ‘civil 
society’ (EIR 2003).  Although the Bank had not been in any way responsible for the development 
and impact of the Ok Tedi mine, the global notoriety of this one operation could easily lead the 
Bank’s critics to question the desirability of strengthening the government’s capacity to sustain the 
industry in which it was embedded. 
As it happens, the contract to produce the Sustainable Development Policy and Sustainability 
Planning Framework for PNG’s mining sector was awarded to a team of consultants headed by the 
designer of the Western Province Capacity Building Project31.  During the course of 2002, team 
members engaged in an extensive process of consultation with national and local stakeholders in 
the mining industry, wrote eight working papers for the Department of Mining, and consolidated 
their findings in a Green Paper published by the Department itself (PNGDOM 2003).  There is no 
space here to review this body of literature, nor has it yet resulted in the adoption of a new policy, 
because a Green Paper is only a discussion paper, and at the time of writing (in 2003), the 
Department has yet to produce the White Paper or the drafting instructions for a new Mining Act 
which would initiate the next phase in the evolution of PNG’s mineral policy framework.  We 
therefore proceed on the assumption that this story ends with the national election of 2002, when 
the wheel of political fortune restored the country’s top political office to Sir Michael Somare. 
Evaluation and Conclusion 
The evaluation of any policy process or policy framework must first confront the question of what 
counts as success or failure, and yet there is no single yardstick against which this evaluation can be 
                                                     
30  This loan was complemented by a grant of 50 million euros from the European Union 
under the so-called ‘Sysmin’ facility, which was partly conditional on the implementation 
of a proposal to transform the Department of Mining into a Mineral Resources 
Authority that would be directly funded through a share of the government’s mineral 
revenues.  Part of the loan from the World Bank has been used to fund the design of 
this new entity, but officials in the central government agencies have so far refused to 
condone its creation. 
31  The principal author of this paper was also a member of the team.   
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made.  For example, policies may be said to have failed because they were inherently faulty or 
because they were poorly implemented.  Design faults may explain the failures of implementation if 
these failures cannot be explained by other factors which the policy makers had no good reason to 
anticipate.  But policies are rarely made or implemented in a vacuum, so it is also necessary to 
consider the specific nature of these external constraints on the mineral policy process, and each of 
these may give rise to its own distinctive form of policy failure.  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the stakeholders who participate in any national policy process do not necessarily share 
the same goals, and what counts as success for one group may count as failure for another. 
PNG’s condition of ‘mineral dependency’ (or more broadly ‘resource dependency’) is one that has 
lasted throughout the period since Independence.  The very fact that PNG still has a mineral-
dependent economy means that the ambitions of the dominant policy makers at the time of 
Independence have not been realised.  The country’s mineral wealth has not been successfully 
applied to the creation of a more diversified national economy, nor has it served to reduce the 
country’s dependence on foreign aid.  Indeed, for all their problems, the mining and petroleum 
industries have continued to provide the bulk of the country’s exports for the last 25 years, yet the 
overall rate of economic growth has barely kept pace with the rate of population growth.  If this is 
proof of policy failure, it is not the failure of mineral policy per se, but the failure of a broader 
national development strategy. 
For those who believe that large-scale extractive industry has more costs than benefits for a country 
like PNG, the government’s ability to foster investment in large-scale mining and petroleum 
projects would itself count as an instance of policy failure, and any activity which has obstructed 
this form of investment would count as a positive contribution to sustainable development.  From 
this point of view, the Bougainville rebellion and the Ok Tedi litigation are not only proof of the 
failure of government policy, but also evidence of the success of other stakeholders within the mineral 
policy process.  Yet this can only be judged as a partial success in light of the history of civil conflict 
in Bougainville following the closure of the Panguna mine, or the fact that the Ok Tedi mine is still 
operating at a profit and still causing massive environmental damage.  Another kind of policy failure 
may now be evident in the pessimism of some national government officials who already subscribe 
to the ‘resource curse’ thesis, and therefore conclude that there is no point in making new policies 
for the mining and petroleum sectors or granting additional resources to those government agencies 
which are responsible for promoting investment in these sectors. 
In one version of this argument, the failure of mineral policy has not consisted in the promotion of 
all forms of private investment in extractive industry, but in the emphasis placed on ‘monster’ 
projects, like Bougainville and Ok Tedi, at the expense of small and medium-scale activities which 
do not have such major impacts on the physical environment and do not place the same degree of 
strain on local social and political institutions.  This argument applies to the mining sector, rather 
than the petroleum sector, because PNG’s oil and gas reserves are not amenable to small and 
medium-scale forms of extraction.  But even in the mining sector, those who say that ‘small is 
beautiful’ – or not so ugly – fail to show how a downsized industry can sustain the levels of public 
expenditure which people are still demanding, and which the government can barely afford to 
provide with current levels of mineral revenue and growing levels of foreign debt. 
If the measure of good policy is derived from the mission statements of the Departments of Mining 
and Petroleum, then the overall level of ‘responsible’ private investment in the mining and 
petroleum sectors is the ultimate test of policy that works.  The decline of exploration spending 
during the 1990s could thus be taken as evidence of policy failure if elements of the mineral policy 
framework were responsible for this process of disinvestment.  If new investment occurs after 
recent and current changes to the policy framework have been brought into effect, this might seem 
to confirm the World Bank’s view that good policy is the key which unlocks the process of 
development.  On the other hand, it would also seem to imply that PNG still has the capacity to 
make and implement good policies for the mining and petroleum sectors, even if it can only do so 
when the Bank is holding its hand.  At the time of writing, it is too early to tell which way the 
barometer will swing, but it is also possible that levels of foreign investment have declined, and 
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might yet be restored, for reasons which are either beyond the control of specific government 
agencies or beyond the reach of the national policy process as a whole.  The fickle and cyclical 
nature of the global markets for different mineral commodities is an external constraint which 
presents a distinctive challenge for any national policy framework. 
The PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum would sum up the policy failures of the national 
government under two headings – taxation and security.  From the investor’s point of view, the 
government has failed to understand the connection between these two issues by imposing 
additional taxes, or constantly changing the fiscal regime, in a political, economic and physical 
environment whose insecurity already adds to the indirect costs of investment and production.  The 
national government’s failure to apply its own share of mineral revenues to a broader national 
process of economic and social development has only compounded this problem, because it has 
contributed to the growing demand for a greater share of these revenues to be distributed to the 
provinces, districts or communities which host the large-scale resource projects from which these 
revenues are derived.  This is often expressed as a demand for local people to be compensated for 
the social and environmental impact of these mining operations.  But if the national share of 
mineral wealth has so far failed to contribute to a broader national process of social and economic 
development, there is no obvious reason to believe that a bigger local share of mineral wealth will 
contribute to a broader local process of economic and social development.  If anything, the problem 
of dependency is more acute at the local level than it is at the national level.  The more that local 
people come to depend on a single mining or petroleum project for their incomes and general 
welfare, the more they are likely to lose when the process of extraction comes to an end.   
By contrast with the forestry sector, we cannot simply say that PNG’s mineral development policies 
have failed because developers have failed to comply with them or because the government has 
lacked the capacity to make them do so.  Although the industry has frequently complained about 
the additional surplus costs which the government has imposed upon it, there has also been a 
recognition of the need to incur such additional costs, even beyond the level required by national 
government policy, as the price of securing local political support for its operations.  At the same 
time, the industry has been held accountable for its compliance with government policy through the 
scrutiny of its own shareholders, by the financial institutions on which it is partially dependent, and 
by the ‘civil societies’ of the developed world where it is domiciled (Filer 2002).  In these respects, it 
is quite unlike the logging industry in PNG, which is dominated by a small group of family-owned 
companies domiciled in Malaysia. 
Some critics have argued that the Ok Tedi court case and the Eighth Supplemental Agreement 
demonstrated the inability of the national government to regulate an industry in which it had a 
vested interest, and this contradiction in the role of government was a kind of policy failure in its 
own right.  But if we consider the whole history of debate about the management of Ok Tedi’s 
waste materials, it is clear that the government has kept its own counsel on the merits of the ‘trade-
off’ between economic benefits and environmental costs, and the only obvious evidence of policy 
failure here would have to be found in a contradiction between the Ok Tedi agreements and the 
National Constitution.  And once we look at the bigger picture of relationships between the 
government and the mining industry, it would be hard to explain the howls of protest with which 
the industry has greeted many of the government’s mineral policy reforms unless the industry is 
playing a very elaborate double game. 
Those critics who find evidence of policy failure in the state’s subordination to international capital, 
or in the contradiction between the government’s twin roles as shareholder and regulator in the 
mining and petroleum sectors, also tend to overlook the deepening divide between the central 
agencies and the line agencies responsible for various aspects of the mineral policy framework.  The 
Departments of Mining and Petroleum have indeed been driven to defend their respective 
industries, and to collaborate more closely with the Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, because the 
rest of the government has either ignored their concerns or made new policy decisions which only 
add more clouds to a difficult investment climate.  In the period from 1974 to 1992, there were 
policy brokers on both sides of the divide who were able to negotiate a ‘whole-of-government’ 
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approach to mineral development policy, even while politicians were deviating from the path of 
righteousness.  It may be true that the exploration boom of the 1980s induced a sense of 
complacency that was rudely interrupted by the outbreak of the Bougainville rebellion, but the 
simultaneous invention of the Development Forum demonstrated their collective capacity for 
adaptive management of major policy issues, and has been applauded as a ground-breaking measure 
by the global policy community (MMSD 2002: 211).  What should have followed was a clear 
articulation of the principles to be applied to the internal distribution and management of the 
government’s mineral revenues, but what happened instead was a lengthy political bunfight over the 
development of the Lihir gold mine and the parallel design of a new Organic Law which actually 
undermined the existing mineral policy framework. 
If multinational mining and petroleum companies have their own reasons for implementing 
national government policy, or being seen to do so, this obviously lightens the load placed on the 
government’s own regulators.  But it should not blind us to the real decline in the capacity of the 
relevant line agencies to accomplish any of their tasks.  Like many other government departments, 
those responsible for promoting and regulating the mining and petroleum industries now operate 
with budgets whose real value has fallen by more than two thirds in the space of a decade, and 
whose staffing levels have fallen by half over the same period.  Most of the national and expatriate 
government officials who were involved in the transformation of the mineral policy regime under 
the Namaliu government or the negotiation of the Lihir project agreements under the Chan 
government have since defected to the private sector.  Their place has been taken by donor-funded 
consultants who can certainly help to design new policies, but cannot readily create the conditions 
under which they will be jointly implemented by a number of different government agencies.  It is 
somewhat ironic that the two government agencies which are responsible for promoting the 
industries that generate as much as half of the government’s domestic revenues should now be 
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